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Abstract—In the channel training phase, the attacker launches
a pilot contamination attack by sending a synchronized and
identical pilot signal with the legitimate transmitter. Such an
attack can contaminate the channel estimation and alter the
legitimate beamformer design. In this letter, we propose a pilot
contamination attack detection scheme and defense strategy for
wireless communications. By considering the prior uncertainty
of the attack, we find that the decision-maker will conservatively
decide the state of the attack, which is a subjective choice. In this
case, we derive the subjective detection probability, the subjective
false alarm probability, and the threshold. We analyze the
tradeoff problem between the ergodic wiretap channel rate and
the subjective detection probability. Furthermore, based on the
worst case that the attacker adopts the optimal power allocation
to launch the optimal attack, we discuss the defense strategy of
the optimal attack. Simulations show that the proposed scheme
has a better performance than the benchmark method.
Index Terms—Pilot contamination attack, defense strategy,
wireless communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
BEAMFORMING can be used to increase the signal powerand enhance the communication security. Generally,
beamformer is designed based on the channel state information
(CSI), which is mainly estimated over the uplink channel [1],
[2]. However, a pilot contamination attacker can actively send
the pilot signal to the receiver, which is identical to the one
from the transmitter to the receiver [3]. The channel training
phase will be contaminated and the beamformer design is
then altered. In this case, the beamformer designed by the
transmitter could cause serious power leakage and degrade
the channel secrecy rate.
The concept of pilot contamination attack was first in-
troduced in [3], whereafter, there have been some work on
this topic [4]–[8]. Yuan et al. [4] has proposed to add a
random sequence to the pilot sequence, which makes it more
difficult for the attackers to learn the pilot sequence. The
code-frequency block group coding based pilot authentication
has been proposed in [5] to separate the spoofer with high
accuracy. Tugnait et al. [6] has superimposed a random
sequence on the training sequence and proposed a source
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enumeration method to detect pilot contamination attack. As
an extension of [6], [7] has improved it via estimation of
legitimate and illegitimate channels, which further remits the
impacts of the pilot spoofing. However, these work requires
the modification of the training sequence structure, which
limits their compatibility with the existing wireless systems.
In terms of the spoofing power optimization, Zhou et al. in
[3] have investigated how an eavesdropper can improve its
eavesdropping performance via pilot contamination attack and
have analyzed an optimal power allocation for eavesdropper.
An energy ratio detector (ERD) without modifying the training
sequence has been proposed in [8] to detect such an attack, in
which the tradeoff problem between the eavesdropper’s power
and the detection performance has been investigated but the
closed-form expression is still missing.
In this letter, we propose the receive power-to-noise ratio
(RPNR) based pilot contamination attack detection scheme,
which needs no prior information about the CSI and the noise,
and requires no modification to the training sequence structure.
With considering the prior uncertainty of the attack, the
closed-form expression for the subjective detection probability,
the subjective false alarm probability, and the threshold are
derived. Moreover, the attacker’s optimal power allocation is
derived, and the defense strategy is discussed based on the
optimal attack.
Notation: Boldface letter denotes matrix, such as A. AH
is the Hermitian transpose of A and RA is the covariance
matrix of A. IM is the identity matrix of dimension M M .
The abbreviation i.i.d. denotes “independent and identically
distributed”. Efg denotes the expectation operator and Cmn
denotes the complex space of matrix of dimension m n.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the considered networks, the time-division duplex (TDD)
is adopted and there are three components, including a legiti-
mate transmitter Alice, an intended receiver Bob, and a pilot
contamination attacker Eve. Alice is a base station equipped
with MT transmit antennas, while Bob and Eve are resource-
limited devices with a single antenna, respectively. Denote
xp(t) as the continuous time unit-energy pilot signal and xNp
as the pilot signal with N samples. The channel between trans-
mitter and receiver is denoted as htr; t; r 2 fA;B;Eg; t 6= r,
which follows zero-mean complex Gaussian process of unit-
variance, i.e., htr  CN (0; IMT ). In the reverse training, the
pilot signal received at Alice is given by
YA =
p
PBhBAxNp +
p
PEhEAxNp +N; (1)
2where YA 2 CMTN , and the channel hBA, hEA 2 CMT1.
 2 f0; 1g represents the absence and the presence of the
attacker, respectively, and PB and PE are the power budget
for Bob and Eve, respectively. N 2 CMTN is the i.i.d.
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), in which each entry
is with zero-mean and variance 2. Alice adopts maximum
ratio transmission scheme to design the beamforming vector
w as
w =
h^AB
k h^AB k
; (2)
where h^AB is the linear minimum mean square error
(LMMSE) estimation of hAB with i.i.d. normalized estimation
error he  CN (0; 
2

N IMT ) and k  k denotes the Euclidean
norm. The LMMSE estimation of h^AE is given by [9]
h^AE =
rPE
PB h^
1
AB : (3)
In the downlink transmission, the N sampled data signal
xNd received at Bob and Eve are given by
yB =
p
PA k h^1AB k xNd +
p
PAh1eHwxNd + n; (4)
yE =
rPAPE
PB k h^
1
AB k xNd +
p
PA ~h1e
H
wxNd + n; (5)
respectively, where PA is the power budget for Alice, n 2
C1N is the AWGN and ~h1e  CN (0; ~
2
1
N IMT ) is the estima-
tion error at Eve with ~21 =
PE
PB 
2
1 .
III. PILOT SPOOFING ATTACK DETECTION
The pilot contamination attack can cause a power leakage
at the receiver. Since the CSI and the noise are unknown, it is
hard to detect the attack roughly via the receive signal power,
especially when the channel environment is worse. Therefore,
we propose the following detection scheme.
In the downlink transmission, the data with N number
of samples is received at Bob, and the sampled covariance
matrix is calculated as RyB = EfyHByBg. Then, the sampled
covariance matrix RyB is written in a diagonal form
EHRyBE = diag(1 + 
2;    ; k + 2| {z }
signal+noise
; 2;    ; 2| {z }
noise
); (6)
where E is the orthonormal matrix corresponding to the
eigenvalue vector. Note that if the eigenvalues are arranged
in the descending order, i.e., 1 + 2      k + 2 >
2 =    = 2, the signal power is concentrated on the first k
eigenvalues. Thereby, we utilize the maximum eigenvalue to
minimum eigenvalue ratio to detect the attacker. The detection
problem is formulated as the following hypothesis test
max
min
=
1 + 
2
2
H0
?
H1
T ; (7)
where H0 indicates the attacker is absent and H1 indicates
the attacker is present. If the test statistic is less than a
threshold T , the decision-maker (Bob) accepts the hypothesis
H1, otherwise, it accepts H0.
A. Subjective Detection Probability & False Alarm Probability
Note that max consists of the majority of the signal power
in yB and min represents the variance of AWGN, however,
they are hard to express via a closed-form expression. Hence,
we transform (7) into the following hypothesis test
k yB k2
min
=
PA k h^AB k2 +PA k he
H
w k2
2
+ 1
H0
?
H1
; (8)
where the threshold  can be denoted by threshold T , namely
 = N [
2(T +N 1)+2++k]
2 . Since w is a unitary matrix,
he
H
w has the same distribution as he
H , i.e., when  =
1, h1e
H
w  CN (0; 21N ) [10]. From the strong law of large
numbers, for N sampled data signal, P ( lim
N!1
k he Hw k2=
2) = 1 [9, 7B.2]. Let ' =k h^AB k2, we can rewrite (8) as
k yB k2
min
=
PA' + PA2
2
+ 1: (9)
When making a decision with prior uncertainty, the conser-
vative subjective choice reflects the real-life decision [11]. The
subjective probability is to model the objective probability1P ,
which is given by
P s = exp
   (ln 1
P
)s

: (10)
The function P s is the subjective probability, which is S-
shaped and asymmetrical, and the subjective parameter s 2
(0; 1] reveals how subjective choice distorts the probability P .
Theorem 1: With considering the prior uncertainty of the
attack, the decision-maker in (7) is conservative, which can
subjectively distort the objective probability.
Proof: We assume the prior probabilities of the attack
presence and absence are P (1); P (0) and the objective prob-
abilities are Pd; Pf . From the law of total probability, the
real-life probabilities can be denoted by P sd = P (1)Pd and
P sf = P (0)Pf . The probability P
s
d(f)  Pd(f) suggests the
choice of decision-marker is conservative under the prior un-
certainty, which subjectively distorts the objective probability.
Whereas, P (1); P (0) is unknown in practice, we use the
subjective probability in (10) to model the real-life perfor-
mance of the RPNR. The subjective false alarm probability is
defined as
P sf = exp
0@ 
0@ln 1
Pr
PA'0+PA20
2 + 1 < 

1As1A
= exp

 

ln
1
F0()
s
; (11)
where Pr(j) is the conditional probability. Similarly, the
subjective detection probability is defined as
P sd = exp

 

ln
1
F1()
s
; (12)
where F(); 2 f0; 1g are the cumulative distribution
1To distinguish the term “subjective”, we use the term “objective” to name
the detection probability and false alarm probability in detection theory.
3functions of the sum of i.i.d. exponential distribution, which
follows the Gamma distribution '   (NMT ; 1  
2

N ). The
objective false alarm probability is given by
F0() = Pr
PA'0 + PA20
2
+ 1 < 

= Pr

'0 <
(   1)2   PA20
PA

=
 (NMT ; z00)
 (NMT )
; (13)
where z0 =
( 1)2 PA20
PA , 0 = 1  
20
N . Similarly, the
objective detection probability is given by
F1() = 1   (NMT ; z11)
 (NMT )
(14)
with z1 =
( 1)2 PA21
PA , 1 = 1  
21
N . For a specified
probability P sf , i.e., P
s
f = 0:1, the threshold is
 = F 10
0B@ 1
exp

s
q
  lnP sf

1CA ; z0 > 0; (15)
where F 10 () is the inverse function of F0().
B. Ergodic Wiretap Channel Rate
Even if there is a beamforming between Alice and Bob,
Eve still can eavesdrop the channel with an ergodic wiretap
channel rate RE which is derived by
RE = E
8<:
"
log
 
1 +
PA k h^AE k2
PA~21 + 2
!#+9=;
= ln 2
Z 1
0
ln

1 +
PA ~'1
PA~21 + 2

~MT1 ~'MT 11
exp( ~1 ~'1)
 (MT )
d ~'1 (16)
=
1
ln 2
exp (A)
MTX
k=1
Ek (A) ; (17)
where (17) is the integral form of the ergodic wiretap channel
rate, ~1 = 1   ~
2
1
N , ~'1 =k h^AE k2. Ek() is the generalized
exponential integral [12], and A = NPA~21+N2 PA~41 2~21NPA .
Remark: If the number of samples is big enough at Bob,
we can approximately calculate the main channel transmis-
sion/secrecy rate using RPNR without any prior channel
knowledge, i.e., the channel CSI and the variance of AWGN.
IV. OPTIMAL SPOOFING POWER AND DEFENSE STRATEGY
When utilizing the RPNR scheme, there is a tradeoff
problem for Eve. If Eve adopts higher power to launch the
attack, it could greatly increase the ergodic wiretap channel
rate. However, higher power increases the probability for Eve
being detected. The tradeoff problem can be formulated as
argmax
PE
(1  P sd ) RE ; s.t. 0  PE  Pe; (18)
where Pe is the power budget constraint at Eve. Substituting
(12), (18) into (18), we get
(1  P sd ) RE =

1  exp

 

ln
1
F1()
s
 1
ln 2
exp (A)
MTX
k=1
Ek (A) : (19)
Substituting (3) into (14), and using the strong law of large
numbers, we can rewrite (14) as
F1() = 1   (NMT ; _z11)
 (NMT )
; (20)
where _z1 =
PE( 1)2 PAPB~21
PAPE . Substituting (20) into (19),
and letting f(PE) = (1   P sd ) RE , we note d
2
d2PE f(PE)  0
(derivation is omitted for brevity), which indicates that f(PE)
is convex with respect to PE . To solve the optimal energy
transmission strategy PE to maximize ergodic wiretap channel
rate, we take the derivative of (19) and obtain (22), which is
shown at the top of the next page. By setting (22) to be zero
and simplifying, we get
PE(   1)2   PAPB~21
PAPE = 0: (23)
The solution to (23) is given by PE = PAPB~
2
1
( 1)2 . Hence, the
attacker’s optimal power allocation is given by
PE =
8><>:
Pe; if Pe < PAPB~
2
1
( 1)2 ,
PAPB~21
( 1)2 ; if 0 <
PAPB~21
( 1)2 < Pe,
0; no attacker.
(24)
Discussion: Considering the attacker can launch the optimal
attack based on the optimal power allocation, we discuss the
defense strategy of the optimal attack. From (24), Eve needs
the parameters, 2, PA, PB , , to obtain the optimal power
allocation. Although 2, PA, PB are usually known by Eve,
the threshold  is unknown, especially when Eve locates far
away from Bob. Hence, we can keep  privacy to prevent Eve
from launching the optimal attack. However, Eve can utilize a
“helper node”, which is close to Bob to derive the threshold .
Even so, we also can defend against the optimal attack through
ensuring the confidentiality of the transmission powers. For
example, Bob can change the transmission power PB in each
reverse training phase via a pre-distribution rule only known
by Alice, which can prevent Eve from launching the optimal
attack. In this case, the ergodic wiretap channel rate RE will
be decreased. Since there is no co-channel interference in TDD
based channel training, the defense strategy can be extended
to the multi-user time division multiple access systems.
V. SIMULIATIONS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In the simulations, there are multiple-antenna at Alice and
single-antenna at Bob and Eve. The probability densities of
the RPNR in the presence/absence of attacker are shown in
Fig. 1 via 10000 times Monte-Carlo simulations. We verify
that the probability densities are different, and the overlapping
area represents the false alarm probability Pf and the miss
4df(PE)
dPE =
s
ln 2
exp(A)
MTX
k=1
Ek(A) exp

  (ln 1
F1()
)s

ln
1
F1()
s 1
F1()
1( _z11)
NMT 1
(NMT   1)! exp(  _z11)
d _z1
dPE (22)
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Fig. 1. The probability density of the proposed
RPNR scheme.
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detection probability 1 Pd corresponding to F0() and F1().
The approximate bound of the threshold is from 1.5 to 2.
By setting s = 1; 0:7, MT = 2; 4 and PA = PB = 2 W ,
for objective/subjective probability, the receiver operating
characteristics (ROCs) are shown in Fig. 2. Both the objective
and the subjective ROCs show that the proposed RPNR has
better detection performance than the ERD method [8]. It
is because our proposed scheme can amplify the power gap
caused by power leakage, especially in worse channel environ-
ment. Interestingly, with MT = 2, the detection performance
is improved with the increase of PE , i.e., PE = 1 W vs.
PE = 0:45 W , but when the power allocation of Eve is opti-
mal, the detection performance is the worst, i.e., PE = 1 W
vs. PE = 0:45W vs. PE = 0:495W . Moreover, the detection
performance is improved with MT increases.
Fig. 3 shows the optimal spoofing power PE with different
subjective parameters s. With MT = 2, PA = PB = 2 W
and P sf = 0:05, the optimal spoofing powers are PE =
f0:495 W; 0:420 W; 0:366 W; 0:327 Wg corresponding to
s = f0:7; 0:8; 0:9; 1g. It suggests that the optimal spoofing
power PE increases with s decreases. We find that a large
range of potential spoofing power PE stays close to the
optimal spoofing power PE . That is, the bigger the subjective
parameter s is, the larger range it is. We conclude that
the proposed subjective probability can increase the system’s
robustness and mitigate the power leakage. When PB changes
from 2 W to 1 W , the optimal spoofing power PE changes
from 0:420 W to 0:2098 W , which shows that the optimal
attack cannot be launched by the attacker without knowing PB
and the ergodic wiretap channel rate RE will be decreased.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have redefined the subjective probability by considering
the prior uncertainty of the attack. A detection scheme has
been proposed based on the received power-to-noise ratio.
We have analyzed the tradeoff problem between the ergodic
wiretap channel rate and the subjective detection probability,
and derived the attacker’s optimal power allocation. Besides,
we have discussed the defense strategy of the optimal attack.
Simulations have validated the proposed scheme.
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